Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Question of Bystander Recovery by Murray, Paul T.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 14 Number 3 Article 10 
4-1-1965 
Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Question of Bystander 
Recovery 
Paul T. Murray 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul T. Murray, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Question of Bystander Recovery, 14 Buff. L. Rev. 
499 (1965). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol14/iss3/10 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED MENTAL DISTRESS: THE QUESTION
OF BYSTANDER RECOVERY
Recent decisions in tort law demonstrate an increased judicial recognition
of the reality of mental distress and suffering. Contemporary courts are re-
examining long established doctrines and theories that in the past have de-
termined the extent of legal protection afforded the individual's interest in
mental security.1 As modem psychiatric methods have revealed that emotional
stress can produce observable physical reactions as well as significant psychic
disorders2 the law, responsive to these findings, has retreated from a position
disfavoring claims of mental pain.3
Mental anguish was first recognized as a component of the damages re-
coverable when the defendant, through his tortious conduct, invaded some
legally protected interests of another. Courts have allowed mental suffering
as "parasitic" damages in actions for bodily injuries,4 false imprisonment, 5
trespass,0 nuisance, 7 and in other claims based on long recognized legal in-
terests.8 In addition, courts have traditionally upheld an independent right to
recover for emotional distress in assault cases9 and in cases involving the mis-
handling of dead bodies.'0 Where the defendant was engaged in some special
calling such as a common carrier,11 inn-keeper, 12 or other public enterprise, 13
the law imposed a duty to refrain from inflicting mental anguish. Where the
1. See generally Amdursky, The Interest in Mental Tranquility, 13 Buffalo L. Rev.
339 (1963); Blessing, The Right to Mental Security, 16 U. Fla. L. Rev. 540 (1964);
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev.
1033 (1936).
2. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 225 (1943); Smith and Soloman, Traumatic Neurosis in Court,
30 Va. L. Rev. 87 (1943).
3. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. 577, 598; 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861) stated: "Mental
pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful
act complained of causes that alone. . . ." In Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152
N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958) the New York Court of Appeals stated, "Free-
dom from mental disturbance is now a protected interest in this State."
4. Serio v. American Brewing Co., 141 La. 290, 74 So. 998 (1917) (fear of sickness
after dog bite); Ferrara v. Galluchio, supra note 3 (anxiety over possibility of cancer
developing from X-ray burn); Rosen v. Yellow Cab Co., 162 Pa. Super. 58, 56 A.2d 398
(1948) (fear over effect of injury on unborn child).
5. Jacobs v. Third Ave. R.R., 71 App. Div. 199, 75 N.Y. Supp. 679 (1st Dep't
1902); Salisbury v. Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 Pac. 315 (1918).
6. Engle v. Simmons, 148 Ala. 92, 41 So. 1023 (1906).
7. Dixon v. New York Trap Rock Corp., 293 N.Y. 509, 58 N.E.2d 517 (1944).
8. See Amdursky supra note 1.
9. Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. 778, 171 S.E. 470 (1933). See generally 6 Am. Jur.
2d Assault and Battery § 183 (1963).
10. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic
Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933).
11. Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869); Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Jones,
39 S.W. 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897).
12. Boyce v. Greeley Square Hotel Co., 228 N.Y. 106, 126 N.E. 647 (1920).
13. Dunn v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907);
Buchanan v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 115 S.C. 433, 106 S.E. 159 (1920) (telegraph
companies); Davis v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 35 Wash. 203, 77 P. 209 (1904) (amusement
park).
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defendant's outrageous acts were intended to cause mental distress or were
recklessly committed and reasonably calculated to cause such suffering, recent
cases allow recovery.14 Even in the intentional infliction of mental anguish
the emotional disturbances occasioned by the defendant's act must be severe
enough to threaten physical well being.15 "Liability still can not be extended to
every trifling indignity,"'16 and mere hurt feelings, even though defendant in-
tentionally caused them, are not a basis for a claim. 17 Where defendant's negli-
gent action produced mental suffering, without contemporaneous bodily injury
of impact, the earlier view denied plaintiff a cause of action. Following the
recent trend, the New York Court of Appeals in Battalla v. State,18 overruled
a long established precedent requiring physical impact upon the plaintiff as a
prerequisite to an action for mental anguish.19 In those states which have
passed on the issue of whether or not physical injury or impact is required
before an action can be established for mental suffering negligently caused, the
majority hold that, where mental anguish is severe and has produced physical
harm, the plaintiff may recover notwithstanding the absence of contemporaneous
physical impact.20
Subsequent to the abandonment of the impact requirement in New York,
actions were brought seeking to extend liability for mental distress to plain-
tiffs outside the area of physical danger created by defendant's negligence.2 1
The results demonstrate a reluctance to expand liability for mental anguish
beyond the person who was the potential victim of the negligent act. In
Kalina v. General Hospital,22 plaintiffs' alleged mental pain and anguish, as a
result of an unauthorized circumcision upon their son, performed by the de-
fendant doctor who had negligently failed to note that plaintiffs wanted the
operation performed by one qualified to do so under their religious law. Their
complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, the trial court
stating that Battalla intended "to realistically enlarge the damage claim of one
acted against. It did not intend to provide a cause of action for interested by-
14. Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); Wilson v. Wilkins, 81 Ark.
137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930) ; State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240
P.2d 282 (1952). See generally Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 40 (1956).
15. Savage v. Boies, supra note 14; Duty v. General Finance Co., 273 S.W.2d 64 (Tex.
1954); accord, Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 70 App. D.C. 183, 105 F.2d 62 (1939).
16. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev.
874, 887 (1939).
17. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
18. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
19. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
20. 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 134, 143 (1959) lists, before the Battalla decision, twenty-four
states as not requiring impact and fourteen states requiring some physical impact as a
prerequisite for a claim of mental distress.
21. Haight v. McEwen, 43 Misc. 2d 582, 251 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Robbins
v. Castilani, 37 Misc. 2d 1046, 239 N.Y.S.2d 53 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Lahann v. Cravotta, 228
N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Berg. v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Kalina v.
General Hospital, 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1961), aff'd, 1 A.D.2d 757,
235 N.Y.S.2d 808 (4th Dep't 1962), aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1023, 195 N.E.2d 309, 245 N.Y.S.2d
599 (1963).
22. 31 Misc. 2d 18, 220 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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standers hitherto excluded."123 This limitation on the Battalla holding has been
followed in later cases. Thus it has been stated that "pre-requisite to a right
of recovery by a claimant unexposed to physical contact or impact is the ex-
istence of a duty owed directly to the claimant by one from whom recovery
is sought .... ",24
Berg v. Baum2 5 presented a vivid example of mental anguish negligently
inflicted on one outside the area of physical harm. The plaintiff mother watch-
ing from a position of safety saw her child struck by the defendant's auto-
mobile. The court declined to allow recovery for her resulting mental disturb-
ance, relying principally on the limitation established in Kalina that the de-
fendant's duty extended only to those in the area of physical peril. Under
the same facts as Berg, the California Supreme Court also denied recovery for
mental anguish.26
However, a recent New York case refused to hold that the zone of
physical risk marked the limit of defendant's duty to safeguard others from
mental distress occasioned by the defendant's negligence.
2 7 Haight v. McEwen28
presented the same facts as the Berg case. The plaintiff saw her son killed
by defendant's vehicle while he crossed the highway; she alleged severe
emotional disturbances as a result of the occurrence. Even though the plaintiff
was not in any danger of physical harm, the court held the complaint sufficient
to state a cause of action stating, "whether or not the defendant should have
anticipated the mother's presence, and whether or not her fright was a foresee-
able consequence of the defendant's negligence may or could be revealed by
proof at the trial."-9 In New York, therefore, there are conflicting decisions on
the extent of liability for negligently caused mental anguish, Kalina and other
cases holding that the plaintiff must be within the zone of physical peril before
a cause of action for mental suffering can be established, while the Haight de-
cision indicates that those outside the zone are not automatically barred from
asserting their claim. The other American jurisdictions that have passed on the
issue either employ the zone of danger limitation or go further and require some
direct physical impact upon the plaintiff before a claim for mental distress can
be brought.30
23. Id. at 20, 220 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
24. Lahann v. Cravotta, 228 N.Y.S.2d 371, 373 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
25. 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
26. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
27. Haight v. McEwen, 43 Misc. 2d 582, 251 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1964), 14
Buffalo L. Rev. 332.
28. Haight v. McEwen, supra note 27.
29. Id. at 585, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
30. Physical impact has been required in: Cleveland, C.C. & St. Ry., v. Stewart, 24 Ind.
App. 374, 56 N.E. 917 (1900)1; State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Village of Isle, 122
N.WV.2d 36 (Minn. 1963); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958); Bedenk v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 285 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1955); Humphrey v. Twin State Gas &
Elec. Co., 100 Vt. 414, 139 AUt. 440 (1927). Presence of plaintiff in the zone of physical
danger has been required before a cause of action may be established in: Amaya v. Home
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It is, consequently, important to examine some of the reasons that lie
behind the reluctance of the courts to extend liability for mental distress beyond
those either physically injured or those wthin the zone of physical danger. It
will be seen that these mechanical formulas of "impact" and "zone of danger"
most commonly employed to limit liability are, for the most part, illogical and
irrelevant with respect to the injury suffered and only serve to obscure the
fundamental policy considerations that actually determine the outcome of the
decisions in this area. A survey of similar cases in England will show an evolu-
tion in the attitude of the English courts concerning claims for mental anguish
from a determination that no such claims can be asserted because of the "re-
moteness" of mental damages to a position that such injuries may indeed be a
foreseeable consequence of negligent activity. Finally an examination of a recent
American case may serve to illustrate the policy factors at work to limit
liability for negligently inflicted mental distress.
Where a mental shock is produced by an intentional attack upon a third
party, the courts have had little difficulty in allowing those seriously upset at
witnessing the attack to recover damages.3 ' Liability has been extended to them
on the grounds that the intentional wrong-doer should "reasonably foresee"
that one observing his act will suffer mental anguish. 2 While the decisions
have been couched in terms of foreseeability, the true reason for expanding
liability in the intentional tort area has more likely been judicial reaction to the
immorality of the defendant's act.P Because the defendant is less censurable
when his conduct is merely negligent, those shocked at witnessing his activity
have a remedy only if they can satisfy certain arbitrary "tests." It is essential
that the jurisdiction be one where emotional distress caused by a negligent act
Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963); Barber v.
Pollock, 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (1963); Kalina v. General Hospital, 18 A.D.2d 757,
235 N.Y.S.2d 808 (4th Dep't 1962); Strazza v McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149
(1959); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Nuckles v. Tennessee Elec.
Power Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258
N.W. 497 (1935). If some independent legal right to be secure from mental disturbance
can be established, plaintiff will recover without having to meet the tests of impact or zone
of danger, see cases cited notes 4 to 14 supra.
31. Young v. Western & Atlantic R.R., 39 Ga. App. 761, 148 S.E. 414 (1929);
Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 Pac. 429 (1916); Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W.
59 (1890). But see, Goddard v. Walters, 14 Ga. App. 722, 82 S.E. 304 (1914). Where the
plaintiff was not present at the time of the attack, Knox v. Allen, 4 La. App. 223 (1926);
Koontz v. Keller Adm'rx 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E.2d 694 (1936), or the defendant did
not know of the plaintiff's presence, Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 IMI. 11 (1877); Hutchinson v.
Stern, 115 App. Div. 791, 101 N.Y. Supp. 145 (4th Dep't 1906), no liability for shock was
imposed. But see Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill. 2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961), Where the plaintiff
suffered nervous shock at the discovery of the bloody body of a neighbor who committed
suicide in plaintiff's kitchen, it was held a jury question whether the decedent's actions con-
stituted an "intentional" infliction of mental distress on the plaintiff, Blakeley v. Shortal's
Estate, 236 Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28 (1945). The plaintiff in this area has almost always
been a close relative of the person intentionally attacked, but such a close relationship has
not been established as essential to recovery, see Hill v. Kimball supra.
32. Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223 S.W. 15 (1920). See Hallen, Damages for
Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 19 Va. L. Rev. 253, 266 (1933).
33. See generally Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendants' Liability,
81 U. Pa. L. Rev. 586 (1933).
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is a legally recognized injury. As it has already been noted,84 some states deny
recovery for mental disturbance unless some physical impact or injury occurs
simultaneously with the mental shock, even in cases where the act was directed
at the plaintiff. Various justifications for such an arbitrary rule have been ad-
vancedY5r Presumably the original reason for denying all relief was judicial
fear of a flood of fraudulent claims which could not be readily disproven.3 6
There is no need to relate here the shift away from this physical impact re-
quirement as a foundation for allowing the parasitic damages of mental suffer-
ing.3 7 However, when the plaintiff is not the potential victim of the negligent
activity but is shocked at the apprehension of injury to another, similar
mechanical formulations survive to bar all relief. Not only must the plaintiff
in such a situation overcome a decided, if inarticulate, judicial skepticism as to
the reality of his mental damage, but he must also satisfy the "tests" of either
impact or zone of danger which have been established not to determine the
existence of a valid claim but to prevent false ones. Furthermore, if the plaintiff
is successful in maintaining a claim, the recovery granted may very well be
completely out of proportion to the injury. In a Missouri case, 38 under the
physical injury test, plaintiff and her child were alighting from a bus when
the doors closed on them. The child slipped under the wheels of the vehicle and
was killed. Plaintiff was awarded an $8000 recovery for her emotional damage
based on a slight bruise on her arm caused by the closing door.
Application of the zone of danger formula likewise results in recovery
bearing little relation to the mental injury sustained. In a recent Connecticut
case,89 plaintiff's house was struck by defendant's negligently driven truck.
Plaintiff was standing in the house two rooms away from the point of impact
and was slightly shaken by the force. Believing her son to be on the porch
which had been demolished by the truck, she became severely upset. The court
allowed recovery for her anxiety because it found that she was within the zone
of physical danger. However recovery was not granted for her fear concerning
her son, but solely for that shock attributable to her apprehension over her
own safety even though ". . . it does not appear that she sought or obtained
medical attention because of it."140 A contrary result was reached in a Maryland
case under similar facts.4 ' There the plaintiff had feared both for his own safety
and also for that of his children who were in a house struck by the defendant's
vehicle. The Maryland court declined to distinguish between plaintiff's fear
34. See note 20 supra.
35. See Hallen, supra note 32, at 266-67; Smith, supra note 2, believes the basic reason
for denying liability was judicial concern over the social burden of expanded liability.
36. See Victorian Rys. Comms. v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (P.C. 1888); Kalen v.
Terre Haute & I.R.R., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N.E. 694 (1897). Cf. Chiuchiolo v. New England
Wholesale Tailors, 84 N.H. 329, 150 At. 540 (1930).
37. See authorities cited note 1 supra.
38. Bedenk v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 285 S.W. 2d 609 (Mo. 1955).
39. Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959).
40. Id. at 719, 156 A.2d at 152.
41. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 Atl. 182 (1933).
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for himself and his fear for his children, allowing recovery for the total
anxiety.
In order to discern the true reason for restricting liability to those in-
jured by defendant's conduct or those within the zone of danger, it is necessary
to look beyond these unrealistic limitations. As the opinion in a classic case in
this area states:
The answer to [the question of liability to those outside the zone of
danger] . . . can not be reached solely by logic, nor is it clear that it
can be entirely disposed of by a consideration of what the defendant
ought reasonably to have anticipated as a consequence of his wrong.
The answer must be reached by balancing the social interest involved,
in order to ascertain how far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right
may justly and expediently be extended.42
While viewing the question as an exercise in judicial balancing of conflicting
policies avoids the arbitrary results of the impact and zone of danger analysis,
it also leads into one of the most controversial areas of tort law.43 Traditionally,
a "duty" is owed only to those whom one can reasonably foresee as being
harmed by one's activity, and it is only those placed in physical peril who are
"foreseeable." This established concept, that the duty to be observed is cir-
cumscribed by the foreseeability of the risk, is essential to a system basing
liability upon fault.44 However, we are presently witnessing a shift in the under-
lying justification of tort liability from fault to rational loss distribution and,45
as a consequence of this change, traditional concepts of duty and its role in
determining liability have been questioned. As Professor Green demonstrates in
his analysis of the duty problem:
Whether [the defendant] ... foresaw or should have foreseen the par-
ticular risk that contributed to the victim's injury is relevant to the is-
sue of negligence, if that issue is reached. But whether the risk created
by the actor's conduct and which contributed to the victim's injury
falls within the scope of the actor's duty is a different matter and is
an issue for the court to decide before the negligence issue becomes
vital. Foreseeability may be a relevant factor for the judge to con-
sider; other factors may be and are usually more important in the
determination of the defendant's duty;, the fact of risk in the par-
ticular case is what actually took place as a result of defendant's con-
duct, not what was foreseen by the actor as likely to take place, and it
42. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
43. See generally Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 Texas L. Rev. 42
(1962); James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 778 (1953); Prosser,
Palsgraf Revisited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1953); Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causatiot,
101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 189 (1952).
44. In Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928)
Cardozo presented the most famous enunciation of the foreseeability concept: "The risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed . .. ."
45. Bloustein, 1963 Ann. Survey Am. L. 363. See generally Ebrensweig, Loss-Shilling
and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation of the Palsgraj Case, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 729
(1941); Green, The Thrust of Tort Law, 64 W. Va. L. Rev. 1 (1961).
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is this risk that must be brought into focus by the courts' judgment on
the duty issue.
46
Obviously, if this approach to the duty issue is employed by the court, the
traditional tests of impact and zone of danger become largely irrelevant be-
cause they depend on foreseeability as the exclusive criterion of defendant's
duty. They do not take Green's "other factors" into account in determining the
duty owed others.
47
Even if the more traditional approach to the duty question is used and
the foreseeability of the particular risk marks the limit of defendant's duty, the
mechanical impact and zone of duty tests are still of little relevance when
the injury sustained is solely a mental one. If the concern is to determine the
existence of a duty to prevent negligent intrusions upon the mental security
of others, why should physical impact upon them or their presence in a zone
of possible bodily injury have any bearing on the existence of that duty?
The English courts, after struggling with the illogcal results produced by
the zone of physical danger approach, have upheld claims of those shocked
at the apprehension of injury to another, by extending the range of foresee-
ability to include mental harms.
Shock as a cause of action in Great Britain was first recognized in Dulieu v.
White & Sons.48 In that case, plaintiff's 'shock arose out of fear for her own
safety when defendant drove his horses into a pub. However, Kennedy, J.
stated that, "The shock, when it operates through the mind, must be a shock
which arises from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to one's self."'49
This limitation was explained on the grounds that it was not ".... reasonably
. .. to be expected" that one would be shocked at another's injury. 0 This
dictum barred claims for shock at witnessing harm to others.
The famous case of Ham brook v. Stokes Bros.,53 established that fear
for the safety of one's children is sufficient for a cause of action where negligence
directly toward the plaintiff is admitted. There defendant's negligently parked
truck rolled down a steep hill striking one of plaintiff's children. The
plaintiff, standing just beyond a curve in the street, saw the driverless truck
crash into a nearby building and realized that it must have passed the place
where she had just left her children. Fearful for their safety, she rushed to
the spot and learned that one of them had indeed been struck. The resulting
46. Green, supra note 43, at 58.
47. Raymond v. Paradise Unified School District of Butte County, 218 Cal. App. 2d
1, 8, 131 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851 (Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1963) lists factors a court should
consider in determining whether the defendant has a duty to the particular plaintiff. They
include: the persons with whom the defendant is dealing, children, adults and so forth; the
relative ability to adopt practical means of preventing injuries; the ability of the parties to
shift or spread the risk of loss; judicial precedence; the prophylactic effect of a rule imposing
liability and the "moral imperatives" the judges share with fellow citizens.
48. [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
49. Id. at 675.
50. Ibid.
51. (19251 1 K.B. 141.
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shock led to her death.52 It is not certain from the opinion whether the plain-
tiff herself was in any physical danger. However, the court did not have to
discuss that question because the defendant had admitted negligence to the
plaintiff and relied on a defense that because her shock was not for herself
but for her children it was not compensable. The court held that once negligence
to the plaintiff was admitted, it was irrelevant whether the shock was occasioned
by fear for one's self or fear for one's children.
Hay (or Bourhill) v. Young was the next English case to consider a claim
of mental anguish occasioned by shock at another's injury. 3 The plaintiff heard
a loud crash caused by the collision of defendant's motorcycle with an automobile
about fifty feet from where she stood. She did not see the accident itself, but
did see some blood on the highway. The noise and the sight of the blood gave
her such a shock that she suffered a miscarriage. She was neither in danger of
physical harm nor in fact shocked at the apprehension of harm to anyone else.54
The court based its decision on the ground that the plaintiff was outside
the zone of physical danger and therefore not foreseeable. Lord Porter
stressed in his opinion that the range of foreseeability should include emotional
as well as physical danger.55 The latest English decision to deal squarely with
the question, King v. Phillips,6 finally rejected the zone of physical danger
as the limit of foreseeability. In King, the plaintiff standing at a window heard
a scream and looking out saw, from a distance of seventy yards, the defendant's
taxicab back over her son's tricycle. She did not see the child struck; in fact
he had been only slightly injured. However, the mother alleged nervous shock
as a result of the incident. The opinions by two of the Lords Justices are
significant because they settled two questions on the extent of foreseeability.
First, the onlooker need not be within the area of physical injury to himself;
the relevant area is one of emotional shock. Secondly, the shock need not be
based on fear for one's self.57 While the status of claims arising from emotional
distress at fear for another's safety remains in some doubt in England, 8 the
English courts have progressed beyond the arbitrary results of the zone of
physical danger formula and have extended duty to encompass a zone of mental
danger. It is fair to assume that future English decisions will hinge recovery
52. While the mother did not actually see her child struck, the case does not stand for
recovery for shock at the news of an accident. "[Tlhe shock resulted from what [she] ...
either saw or realized from her own unaided senses, and not from something someone told
her .. . ." Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., supra note 51, at 152.
53. [1942] 2 All. E.R. 396.
54. "She merely heard a noise, which upset her, without having any definite idea
as to what had occurred. Id. at 406.
55. Id. at 409.
56. [19531 1 Q.B. 429.
57. See the opinions of Singleton, L.J., and Denning, L.J., in King v. Phillips, supra
note 56, at 437-40.
58. Each of the three Lords justices in King v. Phillips, supra note 56, based his
decision on slightly different grounds so that the extent of liability to those outside the
area of physical risk remains unclear. Goodhart, Emotional Shock and the Unimaginative
Taxicab Driver, 69 Law Q. Rev. 347, 353 (1953).
506
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on the factual question of whether the defendant under the circumstances
of the particular case could foresee that the plaintiff would suffer mental
anguish at the apprehension of harm to another.
This extension of foreseeability to encompass an area of mental harm
has not been adopted in American jurisdictions. The American Law Institute
has noted the reluctance of the courts to alter the prevailing rule, and has de-
leted from its draft the Caveat to the first Restatement of Torts which declared
that the Institute expressed no opinion on the liability of a negligent tortfeasor
to those outside the scope of physical peril.0 9 Unless the defendant's negligence
has created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff, the current
draft version of the Restatement Second imposes no liability upon the defendant
for the mental anguish suffered by the plaintiff as a result of his fear for an-
other's safety.60 Moreover, the American cases that have been cited as holding
that those outside the scope of physical peril have a cause of action for their
mental anguish are not in fact authority for that proposition.0 '
Some of the American courts have attempted to go beyond the mechanical
impact and zone of duty limitations and analyze the basic reasons for the re-
striction on liability.6 A recent example of this approach and one that may
serve as an illustration of the countervailing policy factors that lead to the
restriction is the decision of the California Supreme Court in Amaya v. Home
Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.03 The facts present the classic case of a mother
seeing her child run down by the defendant's negligently driven vehicle and
experiencing severe shock at the occurrence. The trial court sustained the defend-
ant's general demurrer. In a unanimous decision the District Court of Appeals
reversed, 4 holding that the defendant did have a duty to the mother even
though she was beyond the area of physical harm. The California Supreme
Court in a 4 to 3 decision reversed, reasoning that a defendant owed no duty
to prevent emotional shock to a mother caused by her seeing defendant's negli-
gent injury to her child. 5 The court determined that a rational result in cases
59. Restatement, Torts § 313 (1934).
60. Restatement (Second) Torts § 313, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960). "The
Advisors are unanimous in wishing to retain the Caveat, for its possible effect upon the
courts-although it must be conceded that it has thus far had no effect. The Reporter
[Prosser] is in sympathy with this position, and feels that there should be liability to a
mother who suffers a heart attack when she sees her child killed before her eyes. He is com-
pelled, however, to recognize that the decisions are otherwise. The Council are agreed that
the Caveat should go out, and the definite rule of non-liability should be stated." Restate-
ment (Second), Torts, Note to Institute, § 313 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1960).
61. Prosser, Torts 181 (2d ed. 1955) cites, Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58
So. 927 (1912); Gulf, C & S. F.R. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906); Cohn
v. Ansonia Realty Co. 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1st Dep't 1914), as cases per-
mitting recovery for mental distress by one outside the zone of physical harm. However,
in both Spearman and Cohn that issue was not raised, and in Gulf recovery was based
on the contract between the common carrier and its passengers.
62. Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950); Barber v. Pollock, 104 N.H. 379,
187A.2d 788 (1963); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
63. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
64. 23 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1962).
65. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). It should be noted that
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like Amaya could only be achieved by balancing the individual's interest
in mental security against the countervailing interests of social policy. Rec-
ognizing that the determination of a duty did not depend solely on foresee-
ability but upon manifold considerations of public policy, the court did not
limit itself to the impact or zone of duty limitations. Listed under the headings
of "The Administrative Factor" and "The Socio-Economic and Moral Factors"
are the policy reasons that compelled the court to limit liability for mental
anguish.66 Under the first heading the opinion expressed a two-fold fear, one
based on the standard of proof necessary in such claims, the other, aroused by
the spectre of limitless liability for mental pain. The court doubted whether, "the
law has now become sufficiently responsive to scientific reality . . ." to insure
the validity of such claims. 67 It deplored the "parade of expert medical wit-
nesses . . ." that are ushered before a jury of inexperienced laymen who must
decide the outcome. 8 Added to this question of proof was a judicial fear of
unlimited liability. The court asked: how serious must the shock be to be
actionable; must some close relationship exist between the plaintiff and the in-
jured party; how close must the plaintiff be in time and space to the impact?"'
The court could supply no answers to these questions and was not satisfied with
the limitations that have been proposed by others.7 0 Indeed the Amaya opinion
suggests that the search for definite limits "may be an inherently fruitless
one."
7 1
Under the second heading, "The Socio-Economic and Moral Factors," the
court stated that extending liability beyond the zone of physical harm would
hamper the general social utility derived from the use of our highways. Doubt
was raised as to the ability of our present system of insurance to absorb the
far-reaching extension of liability that would result.72 The final factor taken
into account to limit liability was the defendant's lack of moral culpability
in the Amaya situation. The court recognized that defendants in cases of
intentional infliction of physical injury have been held liable for the resulting
mental anguish suffered by those beyond the zone of physical harm. But the
opinion ascribed this to the moral guilt of the activity. To impose a similar
burden on the merely negligent actor, the court stated, would result in liability
completely out of proportion to his moral wrong.7 3
the decision presumably did not reflect the reasoning of the majority of the permanent
court. Justice Tobriner disqualified himself, having heard the case in the Court of Appeals
where he authored the unanimous opinion in favor of the plaintiff. Justice White was ap-
pointed pro tempore to hear the case in his absence.
66. Id. at 310-15, 379 P.2d at 522-24, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42-44.
67. Id. at 312, 379 P.2d at 523, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
68. Ibid.
69. Id. at 312, 379 P.2d at 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
70. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 61, at 181 suggests limiting recovery to cases where
the threatened injury upon the other person is a serious one, where the parties are members
of a family, and where the plaintiff saw the accident or the immediate results of it.
71. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 313, 379 P.2d 513, 524, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44.
72. Id. at 314, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
73. Ibid.
COMMENTS
Concerning the first administrative problem enunciated in its decision,
namely the difficulty of distinguishing valid claims, the court admitted that
"it has become almost trite . . ." to criticize decisions based on fears of invalid
claims.74 Indeed it has. Judicial fear of false claims, as a justification for deny-
ing litigants an opportunity to bring actions in our courts, was one of the first
barriers to be removed by modern courts in recognizing a cause of action for
mental distress.75 This same fear can be advanced as easily in many personal
injury actions, physical as well as emotional. Recovery is allowed daily in our
courts for anxiety occasioned by plaintiff's fear for his own safety and at fear
for the safety of others if the plaintiff also was physically threatened, 76 or if
the defendant intentionally caused injury to a third party.77 The problem of
proving the reality of plaintiffs' mental distress in these cases has not prevented
the claimants from being able to bring their actions.
No doubt, substantial difficulties exist in the second administrative area,
namely, what are the ultimate boundaries of liability? Cases are not de-
cided in a vacuum and courts ". . . can not fashion a rule for the case at
bench without reflecting on the fact that there will be other such cases, other
plaintiffs." 78 On the other hand, it is through case by case adjudication that the
law develops, and it is not to be expected that a single decision will establish a
timeless standard for the limits of legal interests. A number of authorities
have attempted to fashion arbitrary limits on the extent of a negligent actor's
liability for mental distress.70 However, even a lengthy list of such limits of lia-
bility for future cases may prove of little help in deciding whether to extend
liability in the present situation. Because a search for definite limits is an
"inherently fruitless one" the lack of such clearly defined boundaries should
not be used to determine whether a particular claim is worthy of consideration.
The dissent in the Amaya case reasoned that because "morally and legally,
there should not be liability in any such general situation is no reason for
holding that, morally and legally, there should not be liability in the limited
situation."80
Passing to the second group of policy considerations, labeled the "Socio-
Economic & Moral Factors," the court in Amaya asserted that recognizing the
plaintiff's claim would have intolerable social consequences. Increased liability
would lessen the individual's incentive to perform socially useful acts because
74. Id. at 311, 379 P.2d at 522, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
75. The New York Court of Appeals has stated: "In the difficult cases, we must look to
the quality and genuiness of the proof, and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophisti-
cation of the medical profession and the ability of the courts and jury to weed out the
dishonest claims." Battafla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 242, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32, 219
N.Y.S.2d 34, 38 (1961).
76. Cases cited note 30 supra.
77. Cases cited note 14 supra.
78. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 313, 379 P.2d 513, 524,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44 (1963).
79. Prosser, supra note 70.
80. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 316, 379 P.2d 513, 526, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 46.
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of a fear of numerous law suits. It would also produce an undesirable economic
effect by increasing the insurance costs necessary to spread the risk adequately-"
There are no factual data, economic or otherwise, given in the opinion to support
these conclusions. Moreover it is at once apparent that such adverse effects
would result only if allowing such claims produced a substantial increase in
the number of actions for mental shock. It is not at all clear that a flood of
claims would necessarily follow from extending liability in cases similar to
Amaya.82 Even assuming that allowing recovery would extend the zone of risk,
it has been clearly demonstrated that traditional zone of risk theories are of
little practical importance in determining the cost of enterprise liability that is
for the most part a product of actuarial techniques.8 3 The lack of any conclusive
demonstration of the effects upon insurance rates and economic activities in
general by extending recovery in cases like Arnaya raises the question whether
the courts should consider such factors at all in deciding where a defendant's
duty lies. A legislative analysis rather than a judicial estimate would seem
to be required before the true effect upon insurance rates of extending liability
could be determined.
Absence of moral guilt on the part of the negligent actor is the last factor
used to limit liability in the Amaya case.84 Generally, lack of moral culpability
has been no barrier to the courts in establishing a duty in negligence actions
and has certainly not restricted liability to the first person affected by the
defendant's conduct. In the so-called "rescue cases," the defendants' morality
or lack of it has not prevented the courts from extending a duty to one injured
while attempting to aid another who had been placed in a position of danger
through the defendants' negligence.85 An evil motive was not required to justify
extension of liability for mental anguish in cases based on breach of contract,80
trespass,87 or negligent mutilation of the corpse of a loved one. 88 If it is true
81. Id. at 314, 379 P.2d at 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
82. Maryland established recovery for mental distress by those within the zone of
physical danger in Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 387, 165 At. 182 (1933), the next case
in the Maryland Court of Appeals to test that limit arose nineteen years later, Resavage v.
Davis, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952). Likewise the last case on the appellate level in
England to deal squarely with the question was King v. Phillips, [1953J 1 Q.B. 429.
83. Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-the Insignificance ol
Foresight, 70 Yale LJ. 554, 574 (1961).
84. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 315, 379 P.2d 513, 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 45.
85. Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 70 N.W.2d 805 (1955); Sarratt v. Halston Quarry
Co., 174 S.C. 262, 177 S.E. 135 (1934); Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133
N.E. 437 (1921). Similarly a defendant's moral position has not prevented his liability from
being extended to cover plaintiff's injuries resulting from subsequent medical malpractice;
,1.ansas City So. R.R. v. Justis, 232 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
833 (1956); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm, 109 Ill. 20 (1884); Thompson v. Fox,
326 Pa. 209, 192 Ad. 107 (1937). Neither the defendant's morality, nor the unforesecability
of the injury has restricted liability when the negligent injury aggravated a latent disease or
defect; Sentilles v. Inter-Carribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959); Flood v. Smith
126 Conn. 644, 13 A.2d 677 (1940), or caused death to a plaintiff with an "eggshell skull,"
Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.
86. Gulf, C. & S.F.R. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
87. Acadia, Cal., Ltd., v. Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 353 P.2d 294 (1960).
88. Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [1939] 1 K.B. 394.
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that tort law is moving away from the concept of liability based on fault to
liability based on loss distribution, moral guilt is of even less weight in deter-
mining liability. As Prosser has observed, "if the loss is out of all proportion
to the defendant's fault, it can be no less out of proportion to the plaintiff's
innocence."89
CONCLUSION
The present treatment of claims arising from shock and grief at the appre-
hension of injury to another when experienced by one in a position of bodily
safety is governed by rules "which are divergent in their theoretical bases,
inconsistently applied, and misapplied to situations where their purposes are
not apt [leading] . . . to results, which, to a layman of ordinary intelligence
must appear hopelessly inconsistent." 90 Presence within a vague "zone" of
physical injury is a prerequisite in many jurisdictions before a claim can be
asserted for an injury that is in no way related to any physical impact upon
the plaintiff or his fear of it. Some jurisdictions that do permit plaintiff within
the zone to recover for his mental distress require him to apportion his shock
between that caused by fear for himself and that caused by fear for another.91
Others allow recovery for the total shock.92 If a plaintiff sees her husband killed
in a collision she will not recover for her mental anxiety unless she can satisfy
either the impact or zone of danger tests. However, if that same plaintiff wit-
nesses the negligent handling of his corpse, recovery may be granted. 93 A
mother seeing one of her children burned to death as the result of defendant's
negligence in an accident in which she also had been injured, was denied recovery
for her mental suffering at seeing her child die.9 4 Yet she may recover for her
anguish concerning the possible effects of her injuries upon her unborn child. 5
It has been noted that such decisions are "not a triumph of reasoning."9 6
A solution has been proposed to deal with these claims for mental anguish
on a more rational ground. Brody advises, "the courts dealing with the problem
on a case to case basis, should determine the degree of relationship between the
observer and the victim necessary to permit recovery . . . . 97 A decision by the
court establishing whether a duty existed in the circumstances of a particular
case would insure the desired consistency. One jury would not be able to grant
recovery for mental anguish to one who was merely a friend of the injured
party, while another jury could deny recovery to the wife or mother of the
one injured. In determining whether a duty should exist to one shocked at
89. Prosser, supra note 43, at 17.
90. Brody, Negligently Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 Vill. L. Rev. 232, 256
(1961).
91. Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959).
92. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 387, 165 AUt. 182 (1933).
93. Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1954).
94. Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295, 133 A.2d 625 (Conn. Super. 1957).
95. Rosen v. Yellow Cab. Co., 162 Pa. Super. 58, 56 A.2d 398 (1948).
96. Lambert, 28 NACCA LJ. 33, 57 (1961).
97. Brody, supra note 90, at 245.
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injury to another, the court could take into account the relevant circumstances
such as the degree of relationship between the parties, the severity of the injury
and the proximity of the plaintiff to the scene. Once the court determines
whether a duty should be imposed, the jury, under the usual standards for
determining the weight of the evidence, could then decide whether the de-
fendant failed in his duty. Liability would result if the defendant, in the circum-
stances of the case, should have reasonably foreseen fright or shock severe enough
to cause substantial injury in a normally constituted person. Such an approach,
recommended by numerous authorities,9 8 adopted in the English courts,9 9 and
advanced by the dissent in the Amaya decision,100 would obviate the necessity
for the mechanical rules surrounding the claims for mental distress at the appre-
hension of injury to another.
PAUL T. MURRAY
OBSCENITY: ROTH GOES TO THE MOVIES
In 1915 the United States Supreme Court held that movies were no more
than a form of commercial entertainment, and were not to be regarded in the
same class as other communication media.' It was not until 1952 that the
Court reversed this judgment and held that motion pictures clearly convey
information and thought, and thus are entitled to the guarantees of free speech
provided by the first and fourteenth amendments. 2 However, the Court was
quick to add that "it does not follow that the Constitution requires absolute
freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places.
That much is evident from the series of decisions of this Court with respect
to other media of communication of ideas." 3 Thus it becomes proper to ask
which movies will not receive the protection of the Constitution. This comment
will concern itself with movies that contain material relating to sex, and the
possible limitations4 of the protection which may be afforded to them.
In Roth v. United States0 the United States Supreme Court held that if
the presentation of the material falls within the category of "obscenity [it]
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press,"0 because
98. Blessing, The Right to Mental Security, 16 U. Fla. L. Rev. 540, 568 (1964); Brody,
supra note 90; 2 Harper & James, Torts 1035-38 (1956).
99. Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [19391 1 K.B. 394.
100. 59 Cal. 2d 295, 316, 379 P.2d 513, 526, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 46.
1. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915)
(". .. [Tihe exhibition of moving pictures is a business pure and simple, originated and
conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded, nor intended to be regarded ...
as part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion."
2. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952). See note 12 infra.
3. Id. at 502-03.
4. E.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). See generally,
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 334, 121 N.E.2d 585 (1954).
5. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
6. Id. at 485.
